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Equality in the Presence of Apartness:






Abstract: The theories of apartness, equality, and n-stable equality are pre-
sented through contraction- and cut-free sequent calculi. By methods of proof
analysis, a purely proof-theoretic characterization of the equality fragment of
apartness is obtained.
Philosophia Scientiæ, Cahier spécial 6, 2006, 61–79.
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1. Introduction
The idea of an apartness relation in place of an equality relation ap-
pears first in Brouwer’s works on the intuitionistic continuum from the
early 1920s. One of the basic insights of intuitionism was that the equa-
lity of two real numbers a, b is not decidable: The verification of a= b
may require that a and b are computed to infinite precision. If a and b
are positively distinct, instead, a finite computation is sufficient. Thus,
Brouwer introduced the notion of apartness as a positive, intuitionistic
basic concept. He also introduced special notations and terminology for
the new intuitionistic concepts. We shall here use a uniform notation in
which the intuitionistic notion is written with a slash over the classical
one, as in a 6= b. The properties of this notion of apartness are, first, irre-
flexivity ¬ a 6=a, and, secondly, the “splitting” of an apartness a 6= b into
two cases a 6= c and b 6= c, for any middle term c. Intuitively, if a and b are
positively apart, any c is apart from a or from b, for were this not the
case with, say, a, it would positively be the case with b.
A notion of equality can be defined through negating apartness. Ir-
reflexivity of apartness gives reflexivity of equality, and the “splitting”
property has a contraposition that gives: If a= c and b= c, then a= b.
This is the “Euclidean” formulation of transitivity of equality. Symmetry
follows by setting c identical to a.
Brouwer introduced a whole range of notions relating to the notion of
apartness, often with very idiosyncratic notations or terminologies. For
example, in his (1927, 1950) a strict linear order a < b was introduced,
with the symmetrization a < b ∨ b < a corresponding to apartness,
and the double negation ¬¬ a < b giving “the non-contradictory of the
measurable natural order on the continuum.”
A formal treatment of apartness relations began with Heyting’s (1927)
formalization of elementary intuitionistic geometry. In it, point and li-
ne equalities were replaced by corresponding apartnesses and the ba-
sic axiomatic properties studied. Heyting’s little book (1956) presented
intuitionistic axiomatizations of apartness and order relations. In the
1960s, such relations were used in different approaches to constructive
analysis, as in Scott (1968) who established the notation we use. At the
same time, there began a period when intuitionistic axiomatic systems
were studied by the means of Kripke semantics, as in Smorynski (1973).
Among the work of this period, there was an isolated paper by Van Dalen
and Statman (1978) who studied the theory of apartness by syntactic,
proof-theoretical means. Described as an “unpretentious little paper” in
Smorynski’s review (1980), it formulated the theory of apartness as an
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extension of natural deduction in which the axioms for apartness were
turned into nonlogical rules of inference. Van Dalen and Statman defi-
ned the theory of apartness as an extension of the theory of equality,
with two primitive basic notions related by an axiom stating that the
negation of apartness implies equality, and closure of apartness under
substitution of equals. Next, they defined a hierarchy of extensions of
the theory of equality, the first consisting in the addition of a stability
axiom for equality, the n-th given by the addition of a generalized stabi-
lity axiom Sn (see Section 4 for the details). By analyzing the structure
of formal derivations in the system, Van Dalen and Statman were able
to prove that if a formula containing no apartness symbol is derivable
in the theory of apartness, then it is derivable in an appropriate n-th
extension SEQn of the theory of equality. Next to this main result, they
also showed by the use of Kripke models that each extension is proper,
that is, all the stability axioms are needed to characterize the equality
fragment of apartness.
In this paper we present, as an application of proof analysis in se-
quent calculi, a simplification of the argument of Van Dalen and Statman
that was based on normalization in natural deduction, and replace their
semantical arguments by proof-theoretical ones. As a background, we
mention the work Negri (1999) that set out to solve a problem stemming
directly from Van Dalen and Statman: To show that if equality is defined
as the negation of apartness and if all the atomic formulas of a formula A
appear negated, the derivability of A in the theory of apartness reduces
to its derivability in the theory of equality. If we call formulas of the said
kind “negatomic,” the result is that the quantifier-free theory of apart-
ness is conservative over the theory of equality for negatomic formulas.
This is in no way obvious, because the “split” axiom has a disjunction in
a positive part.
In Negri (1999) and Negri and von Plato (1998), a systematic method
was developed for extending sequent calculi with rules that correspond to
mathematical axioms, in such a way that the structural properties of the
logical sequent calculus are maintained in the extension. In particular,
the admissibility of weakening, contraction, and cut permit to extend
the methods of structural proof analysis of first-order logic to many
mathematical theories.
By these results, the theory of apartness can be presented as a contrac-
tion- and cut-free sequent calculus. Equality is here a defined notion,
given by the negation of apartness. A sequent calculus for the theory
of defined equality is obtained by permitting rules with a specific suc-
cedent, in this case ⊥, needed for translating into a rule the axiom of
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transitivity. By using minimal logic, rather than intuitionistic logic, as
a basic logical calculus, cut elimination is maintained. The reduction to
minimal logic is justified by a conservativity result for sequents in the
language of equality, that is, negatomic sequents (Theorem 21). Next we
show how the conservativity result of Van Dalen and Statman follows
in our approach by a straightforward analysis of cut-free derivations in
the calculus for apartness. Finally, we obtain in a purely proof-theoretic
way the result on proper extensions by showing the underivability of the
generalized stability axiom Sn+1 in the n-th extension of the theory of
equality.
2. Background on Proof Analysis
In Negri (1999) the intuitionistic theories of apartness and order were
presented as contraction- and cut-free sequent calculi. The method, ba-
sed on the conversion of axioms into inference rules, was then generalized
in Negri and von Plato (1998, 2001) and in Negri (2003). We recall here
the general ideas of the method and the main results. In addition, we
show how the use of minimal logic permits a useful extension of the rule
scheme for dealing with certain axioms that contain negations also in
their negative part.
For extensions of intuitionistic predicate logic the starting point is
the contraction- and cut-free multisuccedent sequent calculusG3im (see
Negri and von Plato 2001, p. 108, for a table of rules). We shall here de-
al only with multisuccedent systems, and therefore leave out the suffix
m from the name of this and derived systems. In G3i all the structu-
ral rules, weakening, contraction, and cut, are admissible, meaning that
whenever their premisses are derivable, then so is their conclusion. Wea-
kening and contraction are in addition height-preserving admissible, that
is, whenever their premisses are derivable with derivation height boun-
ded by n, then also their conclusion is derivable, with the same bound
on the derivation height (the height of a derivation is its height as a tree,
that is, the length of its longest branch). Moreover, the calculus enjoys
height-preserving admissibility of substitution (see Chapters 3 and 4 of
Negri and von Plato 2001 for detailed proofs).
The structural properties of G3i are maintained in extensions of the
logical calculus with suitably formulated rules that represent axioms for
specific theories. Formulas of the form P1& . . .&Pm ⊃ Q1 ∨ · · · ∨ Qn,
where the consequent is ⊥ if n = 0 and all Pi, Qj are atomic, called
regular formulas, are converted into a schematic rule, called the regular
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rule scheme, of the form
Q1, P ,Γ⇒ ∆ . . . Qn, P ,Γ⇒ ∆
P ,Γ⇒ ∆
Reg
where P abbreviates the multiset P1, . . . , Pm.
In order to maintain admissibility of contraction in the extensions
with regular rules, the formulas P1, . . . , Pm in the antecedent of the con-
clusion of the scheme have, as indicated, to be repeated in the antecedent
of each of the premisses. In addition, whenever an instantiation of free
parameters in atoms produces a duplication (two identical atoms) in the
conclusion of a rule instance, say P1, . . . , P, P, . . . , Pm,Γ⇒ ∆, there is a
corresponding duplication in each premiss and in the conclusion of the
rule. The closure condition imposes the requirement that the rule with
the duplication P, P contracted into a single P be added to the system
of rules. For each axiom system, there is only a bounded number of pos-
sible cases of contracted rules to be added, very often none at all, so the
condition is unproblematic.
The main result for such extensions is the following (Theorems 6.2.1,
6.2.2., 6.2.3 of Negri and von Plato 2001):
Theorem 1 The structural rules of weakening, contraction, and cut are
admissible in all extensions of G3i with the regular rule scheme Reg and
satisfying the closure condition. Weakening and contraction are moreover
height-preserving admissible.
In classical logic, each universal axiom can be converted, through re-
duction to conjunctive normal form, to a conjunction of regular formulas,
and therefore all universal axioms can be converted into regular rules. By
using intuitionistic logic, we have instead a limitation to those axioms
that are constructively equivalent to a conjunction of regular formulas.
In particular, implications the antecedents of which are implications, or
more specifically, negations, are left out by the general treatment. There
is however a special case of implication of this form that is met when
treating equality as the negation of apartness: If equality a= b is defined
as ¬ a 6= b, then transitivity (in the Euclidean form) is the axiom
¬ a 6= c & ¬ b 6= c ⊃ ¬ a 6= b
that does not follow the form of a regular formula, but is of the form
¬ P1& . . .&¬ Pn ⊃ ¬Q
66 Bianca Boretti and Sara Negri
It can be converted into the rule
P1,Γ⇒⊥ . . . Pn,Γ⇒⊥
Q,Γ⇒⊥
or, more precisely, taking into account the requirements for the admis-
sibility of weakening and contraction, into
P1, Q,Γ⇒⊥ . . . Pn, Q,Γ⇒⊥
Q,Γ⇒ ∆,⊥
Reg⊥
Observe that the succedent of the above scheme is not an arbitrary
multiset as required in the regular rule scheme, but the logical constant
⊥. In general, cut elimination would fail in the presence of a scheme
of this form; However, it is maintained in extensions of minimal, rather
than intuitionistic, logic.
In general, a calculus for minimal logic is obtained from a calculus
for intuitionistic logic by removing the axiom of ex falso quodlibet. In G3
calculi, the identity axiom is restricted to atomic formulas, thus, in order
to obtain a G3 calculus for minimal logic, rule L⊥ is removed from the
rules of G3i, but its special instance ⊥,Γ⇒ ∆,⊥ is added. The calculus
thus obtained is called G3m. We have:
Theorem 2 The structural rules of weakening, contraction, and cut are
admissible in all extensions of G3m with rules following the regular rule
scheme Reg or the scheme Reg⊥ and satisfying the closure condition.
Weakening and contraction are moreover height-preserving admissible.
Proof. Admissibility of weakening and contraction presents no additio-
nal difficulties as compared to the proof for extensions of G3i with the
regular rule scheme. As for admissibility of cut, we have to analyze those
new cases in which the active formula of the scheme Reg⊥ is the cut
formula






If ⊥ is not principal in the right premiss of cut, the cut is permuted with
the rule concluding the right premiss of cut, and the height decreased.
If it is principal, the right premiss is necessarily an initial sequent of the
form ⊥,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′′,⊥ and the conclusion of cut is obtained by weakening
from the left premiss. ✷
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The analysis of cut-free derivations in regular extensions of G3i or in
extensions of G3m with rules following the rule scheme Reg⊥ is based
on the weak subformula property: All formulas in a derivation are
subformulas of the endsequent or atomic formulas. This property ensures
many of the consequences of the full subformula property and can often
be strengthened by the subterm property: All terms in a derivation
are terms in the conclusion. Thus, only a bounded number of distinct
atomic formulas appear.
3. Sequent Calculi for the Theories of Apart-
ness and Order
The apartness relation is an intuitionistic basic notion that represents
“a positive analogue of the inequality relation on the continuum” (Van
Dalen and Statman 1978, p. 95). Inequality thus becomes a basic notion
in intuitionistic axiomatics. As explained in the introduction, we shall use
the symbol 6= for apartness, and denote ‘a is apart from b’ by a 6= b. The
negation of equality, a= b ⊃ ⊥, will be denoted by ¬ a= b. Van Dalen
and Statman, instead, use the symbol # for apartness and 6= as an
abbreviation for the negation of equality.
The axioms for apartness are1
Irref ¬ a 6=a Split a 6= b ⊃ a 6= c ∨ b 6= c
Following the method of extension with rules recalled in Section 2, we
have:
Definition 3 The sequent calculus for the theory of apartness G3AP
is obtained by adding to G3i the following rules
a 6= a,Γ⇒ ∆
Irref
a 6= c, a 6= b,Γ⇒ ∆ b 6= c, a 6= b,Γ⇒ ∆
a 6= b,Γ⇒ ∆
Split
As an application of the general result recalled in Theorem 1 we have:
Theorem 4 The structural rules of weakening, contraction, and cut are
admissible in G3AP.
The axioms for the theory of defined equality are
Irref ¬ a 6= a Trans ¬ a 6= c& ¬ b 6= c ⊃ ¬ a 6= b
1In the literature, the split axiom in the form a 6= b ⊃ a 6= c ∨ c 6= b is called also
co-transitivity.
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The latter is not a regular formula, because there are implications (ne-
gations) in the antecedent of an implication. However, as we have seen
in Section 2, such an axiom can be added to sequent calculus in the form
of a rule and admissibility of the structural rules maintained, if minimal
logic is used as a logical basis.
Definition 5 The calculus G3EQ is obtained by adding to the multi-
succedent calculus for minimal logic G3m the rules
a 6=a,Γ⇒ ∆
Irref
a 6= c, a 6= b,Γ⇒ ⊥ b 6= c, a 6= b,Γ⇒ ⊥
a 6= b,Γ⇒ ∆,⊥
Split⊥
By Theorem 2 we have:
Theorem 6 The structural rules are admissible in G3EQ. Weakening
and contraction are height-preserving admissible.
As a corollary of cut elimination we have:
Corollary 7 The calculi G3AP and G3EQ satisfy the weak subfor-
mula property: Each formula in a derivation is a subformula of the end-
sequent or an atomic formula.
The axioms of reflexivity, transitivity, and stability, ¬¬ a= b ⊃ a= b, are
derivable in the calculus G3EQ, thus the calculus is complete for the
theory of stable equality.
4. The Equality Fragment of Apartness
In Negri (1999) it was proved that, for the propositional part, the theory
of apartness is conservative over the theory of equality defined as the
negation of apartness. In other words, the axiom of stability added to the
theory of equality suffices for ensuring conservativity in the propositional
fragment.
In order to isolate “the equality fragment of AP”, Van Dalen and
Statman identify in ∀z(¬ z=a∨ ¬ z= b) an important kind of inequality
relation, stronger than the ordinary inequality. They give the following
inductive definition:
a 6=0b ≡ ¬ a= b a 6= n+1b ≡ ∀z(z 6= na ∨ z 6= nb)
Parallel to these generalized inequality relations, a sequence of generali-
zed stability axioms, stronger than ordinary stability, is given:
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Sn ≡ ¬ a 6= nb ⊃ a= b
Defining as SEQω the ω-stable theory of equality EQ+ {Sn|n ∈ ω}, Van
Dalen and Statman (1978, p. 105) prove, by means of natural deduction,
the following result:
Suppose that B is an equality formula, X is a set of equality
formulæ and Y is a set of apartnesses.
Set Y (n) = {t1 6= nt2 : t1#t2 ∈ Y } [. . . ]
If X ∪ Y ⊢AP B, then X ∪ Y (n) ⊢SEQωB for some n.
Therefore, the theory AP is conservative over SEQω.
In order to achieve a fully proof-theoretical account of the results
by Van Dalen and Statman, we give a sequent calculus in which the
inequality relations 6= n and the generalized stability axioms are added
in the form of nonlogical rules to the theory of defined equality:
Definition 8 The calculus G3EQn for n > 0 is obtained by adding to
G3EQ the rules Splitm and Defm (for all m) and the rule Sn
a 6= m−1c, a 6= mb,Γ⇒ ∆ b 6= m−1c, a 6= mb,Γ⇒ ∆
a 6= mb,Γ⇒ ∆
Splitm
Γ⇒ a 6= m−1x, b 6= m−1x
Γ⇒ ∆, a 6= mb
Defm
a 6= nb, a 6= b,Γ⇒ ⊥
a 6= b,Γ⇒ ∆,⊥
Sn
where, in rule Defm, the variable x must not appear free in the conclu-
sion.
Note that, in the theory of defined equality, a 6=0b ≡ ¬¬ a 6= b, and there-
fore G3EQ0 ≡ G3EQ+S0 ≡ G3EQ.
Lemma 9 The sequents
a 6= m+1b⇒ ∀x(a 6= mx ∨ b 6= mx) and ∀x(a 6= mx ∨ b 6= mx)⇒ a 6= m+1b
are derivable in G3EQn.
Proof. By means of Splitm+1 and Defm+1 respectively. ✷
Lemma 10 The sequent ¬ a 6= nb⇒ ¬ a 6= b is derivable in G3EQ
n.
Proof. By induction on n. If n = 0, by the definition of 6=0 we have the
sequent ¬¬¬ a 6= b⇒ ¬ a 6= b. If n > 0, Sn is used. ✷
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Lemma 11 All sequents of the form a 6= nb,Γ ⇒ ∆, a 6= nb are derivable
in G3EQn.
Proof. By induction on n. For n = 0, use the definition of 6=0 and steps
of propositional logic. For n > 0, apply the inductive hypothesis and use
Splitn and Defn. ✷
As for G3EQ, it is routine to prove:
Theorem 12 The rules of weakening and contraction are admissible
and height-preserving in G3EQn.
Formulas of the form a 6= nb are by definition compound formulas, but
here they are regarded as atomic and will be called inequality formu-
las.
The proof of cut elimination follows the usual structure of the proof
for extensions of G3 calculi with nonlogical rules, with one extra case
due to the presence of a detour cut on inequality formulas. The proof is
by induction on the weight of the cut formula with subinduction on cut
height. The weight is defined as usual for compound formula, with an
extra degree of complexity for formulas of the form a 6= nb. The definition
of weight of a 6= nb takes into account the inductive definition of the
relations 6= n and is made consistent with the definition of weight of
formulas (cf. Negri and von Plato 2001, pp. 30 and 67).
Definition 13 The weight of an inequality formula is
w(a 6= 0b) ≡ 3 w(a 6= n+1b) ≡ 2w(a 6= nb) + 2
For our purposes, it is enough to note that the definition of weight for
an inequality formula is an increasing function of n.
Rules Splitn and Defn emulate the left and right universal quantifier
rules. A substitution lemma is therefore needed for dealing with detour
cuts on inequality formulas. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma
4.1.2. in Negri and von Plato (2001).
Lemma 14 If Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in G3EQn and t is free for y in Γ,∆,
then Γ(t/y)⇒ ∆(t/y) is derivable in G3EQn with the same derivation
height.
Theorem 15 The rule of cut is admissible in G3EQn.
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Proof. By induction on the weight of the cut formula with subinduction
on cut height. Let us consider only the cases introduced by the new
nonlogical rules. The cases in which neither premiss of cut is concluded
by Defn are handled as in the proof of Theorem 2.
If the left premiss of cut is a conclusion of Defn with the cut formula
not principal in it, the conclusion of cut is obtained by the rule and
several weakenings. If the left premiss is a conclusion of Defn with the
cut formula principal in it but not in the right premise, we permute the
cut upwards in the derivation; otherwise the right premiss is a conclusion
of Splitn and the derivation is
Γ ⇒ a 6= n−1x, b 6= n−1x
Γ⇒ ∆, a 6= nb
Defn
a 6= n−1c, a 6= nb,Γ
′







Γ, Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
Cut
First we cut the conclusion of Defn with the left premiss of Splitn
Γ ⇒ a 6= n−1x, b 6= n−1x
Γ⇒ ∆, a 6= nb
Defn
a 6= n−1c, a 6= nb,Γ ⇒ ∆





Then we cut the conclusion of Defn with the right premiss of Splitn
Γ ⇒ a 6= n−1x, b 6= n−1x
Γ⇒ ∆, a 6= nb
Defn
b 6= n−1c, a 6= nb,Γ ⇒ ∆





Observe that both cuts have reduced height. Finally, we use the conclu-
sions of the preceding derivations as follows:
Γ⇒ a 6= n−1c, b 6= n−1c a 6= n−1c,Γ,Γ
′ 1.
⇒ ∆,∆′
Γ, Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′, b 6= n−1c
Cut
b 6= n−1c,Γ, Γ
′ 2.
⇒ ∆,∆′
Γ, Γ, Γ,Γ′,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆,∆′,∆′
Cut
Γ, Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
Ctr∗
where Ctr∗ stands for several contractions and the sequent
Γ⇒ a 6= n−1c, b 6= n−1c
is obtained by Lemma 14 from the premiss of Defn. Note that the two
cuts are reduced in weight.
Finally, if the right premiss is a conclusion of Defn, the cut formula is
not principal in it and we apply the inductive hypothesis to the premiss
of this rule. ✷
Corollary 16 The calculus G3EQ enjoys the weak subformula proper-
ty: Each formula in a derivation is a subformula of the endsequent, or
an atomic, or an inequality formula.
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Definition 17 The calculus G3EQω is given by the extension of G3EQ
with the rules Splitn, Defn, and Sn for all natural numbers n.
In systems with defined equality, formulas in the language of equality are
those in which all apartness atoms occur negated. These are identified
by the following definition:
Definition 18 A formula A is negatomic if all its atoms are negated.
A sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is a negatomic if all the formulas in it are negatomic.
Note that, by the weak subformula property, a derivation of a negatomic
sequent Γ⇒ ∆ in G3AP contains only atomic or negatomic formulas.
In order to prove the conservativity of G3AP over the calculus
G3EQω for negatomic sequents, we show first that the reduction to
minimal logic is not restrictive. In fact, we show below that if a nega-
tomic sequent is derivable in the intuitionistic theory of apartness, it is
derivable also in the minimal theory.
Definition 19 The calculus G3mAP is obtained from G3AP by re-
placing rule L⊥ with the initial sequent ⊥,Γ⇒ ∆,⊥.
Next we show that for derivations of negatomic sequents, the restriction
to minimal logic can be made without loss of generality.
Lemma 20 If C is negatomic, then ⊥,Γ⇒ ∆, C is derivable in
G3mAP.
Proof. By induction on the size of the formula C. ✷
Theorem 21 If a negatomic sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable in G3AP,
then it is derivable also in G3mAP.
Proof. If the derivation of Γ ⇒ ∆ in G3AP contains no instances of
L⊥, then there is nothing to prove. If the derivation contains an istance
of L⊥ with a negatomic formula in the succedent, we apply Lemma 20.
A derivation of a negatomic sequent in G3AP can contain also atomic
formulas, so it can contain an instance of L⊥ with an atomic succedent




¬ P,Γ⇒ P ⊥,Γ⇒ ∆
¬ P,Γ⇒ ∆
L ⊃
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that can be replaced by
¬ P ⇒ ¬¬¬ P
⊥,¬ P,Γ′ ⇒ ⊥
⊥,Γ′ ⇒ ¬¬ P
R ⊃
....





where the sequent ¬ P ⇒ ¬¬¬ P is derivable in minimal logic. ✷
In G3EQn, we can prove, by induction on n and application of rule
Defn:
Lemma 22 The sequent ⊥,Γ ⇒ ∆, a 6= nb is derivable in the calculus
G3EQn for all n.
Corollary 23 The zero-premiss rule Irrefn
a 6= na,Γ⇒ ∆
Irrefn
is admissible in G3EQn for ∆ containing an inequality or negatomic
formula.
Proof. By induction on n. If n = 0, use the definition of 6=0, Irref ,
Lemmas 20 and 22, and steps of propositional logic. If n > 0, apply the
inductive hypothesis and Splitn. ✷
Corollary 24 The sequent ¬ a 6= b⇒ ¬ a 6= nb is derivable in G3EQ
n.
Proof. By induction on n. For n = 0, by steps of propositional lo-
gic we derive the sequent ¬¬ a 6= b,¬ a 6= b ⇒ ⊥, which is equivalent to
a 6= 0b,¬ a 6= b⇒ ⊥ by definition of 6=0. We obtain then ¬ a 6= b⇒ ¬ a 6= 0b
by an application of R ⊃ . Next, let us suppose by inductive hypothesis
that the sequent ¬ a 6= b ⇒ ¬ a 6= nb is derivable; then by invertibility of
R ⊃ also a 6= nb,¬ a 6= b⇒ ⊥ is derivable. We have the following deriva-
tion:
a 6= nb, a 6= n+1b,¬ a 6= b⇒ ⊥ b 6= nb, a 6= n+1b,¬ a 6= b⇒ ⊥
Irrefn
a 6= n+1b,¬ a 6= b⇒ ⊥
Splitn+1
¬ a 6= b⇒ ¬ a 6= n+1b
R ⊃
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where the sequent a 6= nb, a 6= n+1b,¬ a 6= b ⇒ ⊥ is obtained by height-
preserving weakening. ✷
We are now in a position to prove the conservativity theorem that cha-
racterizes the equality fragment of apartness. The proof is similar to the
proof presented in Troelstra and Schwichtenberg (2000) that in turn was
inspired by the method in Negri (1999). The central idea is the replace-
ment of apartness atoms, for each step of Split in the derivation, with
appropriate inequality formulas. The definition of positive and negative
occurrences of a symbol in a formula is standard.
Definition 25 Let Γ ⇒ ∆ be a sequent in the language of apartness.
Then Γ(n) ⇒ ∆(n) denotes the sequent obtained by replacing all posi-
tive occurrences of 6= in Γ and all negative occurrences of 6= in ∆ by
6= n and by replacing all negative occurrences of 6= in Γ and all positive
occurrences of 6= in ∆ by 6=0.
Lemma 26 If the sequent Γ(n) ⇒ ∆(n) is derivable in G3EQn, then
also Γ(n+ 1)⇒ ∆(n+ 1) is.
Proof. For each replaced atom a 6= nb, use the derivable sequent
a 6= n+1b⇒ a 6= nb ✷
Theorem 27 If Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable in G3mAP, then there exists n
such that Γ(n)⇒ ∆(n) is derivable in G3EQn.
Proof. By induction on the height h of the given derivation. If h = 0
and Γ ⇒ ∆ is of the form a 6= b,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, a 6= b, observe that, by Lemma
11, a 6= nb,Γ
′(n) ⇒ ∆′(n), a 6= nb is derivable in G3EQ
n for all n and a
cut with a 6= nb ⇒ a 6= 0b gives a derivation of the sequent Γ(n)⇒ ∆(n).
If Γ ⇒ ∆ is of the form ⊥,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′,⊥, then ⊥,Γ′(n) ⇒ ∆′(n),⊥ is for
all n an initial sequent in G3EQn as well. If it is an instance of Irref ,
a 6=a,Γ′ ⇒ ∆, the sequent a 6= na,Γ
′(n) ⇒ ∆(n) is by Corollary 23 an
admissible instance of Irrefn in G3EQ
n.
If the last rule in the derivation is a logical rule, apply the inductive
hypothesis to the premiss(es) of the rule and then the rule.
If the last rule is Split , with premisses
a 6= c, a 6= b,Γ′ ⇒ ∆
and
b 6= c, a 6= b,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,
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by the inductive hypothesis there exist n and m such that the sequents
a 6= nc, a 6= nb,Γ
′(n) ⇒ ∆(n) and a 6= mc, a 6= mb,Γ
′(m) ⇒ ∆(m) are deri-
vable in G3EQn and in G3EQm, respectively. Choose p ≥ n,m. Then,
by Lemma 26, a 6= pc, a 6= pb,Γ
′(p)⇒ ∆(p) and a 6= pc, a 6= pb,Γ
′(p)⇒ ∆(p)
are derivable in G3EQp. By using the derivable a 6= p+1b ⇒ a 6= pb, the
sequents
a 6= pc, a 6= p+1b,Γ
′(p)⇒ ∆(p)
and
a 6= pc, a 6= p+1b,Γ
′(p)⇒ ∆(p)
are derivable in G3EQp. By Splitp+1 and Lemma 26 we derive
a 6= p+1b,Γ
′(p+ 1)⇒ ∆(p+ 1) ✷
We observe that it is necessary to prove the above theorem for arbitrary
sequents, and not just negatomic ones, because the premisses of a logical
rule with negatomic conclusion need not be negatomic.
Corollary 28 If a negatomic sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable in G3AP,
then it is derivable in G3EQω.
Proof. By Lemma 20 a negatomic sequent derivable inG3AP is deriva-
ble in G3mAP. By Theorem 27, Γ(n) ⇒ ∆(n) is derivable in G3EQn
for some n, and using the equivalence ¬ a 6= nb⇔ ¬ a 6= b (Lemma 10 and
Corollary 24), Γ(n) ⇒ ∆(n) is equivalent to the (negatomic) sequent
Γ⇒ ∆. ✷
5. Underivability through Proof Analysis in
G3EQn
We shall prove that the whole system G3EQω is needed in order to
deal with the equality fragment of the theory of apartness, because for
no n does G3EQn suffice: Each theory G3EQn+1 is, in fact, a proper
extension of the theory G3EQn.
We establish first the subterm property for G3EQn. We recall that
a derivation is minimal if no local shortenings through deletion of steps
are possible: For example, if a conclusion of a rule becomes an instance
of an initial sequent, the derivation can be shortened by pruning the
branch above that sequent; If a rule has the effect of a contraction, the
rule can be deleted by height-preserving contraction.
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Theorem 29 In a minimal derivation in G3EQn, all terms are eigen-
variables or terms in the conclusion.
Proof. We show that in a minimal derivation all middle terms of Split⊥
and of Splitn are terms in the conclusion.
Consider the last occurrence of a term c removed by Split⊥
a 6= c, a 6= b,Γ⇒ ⊥ b 6= c, a 6= b,Γ⇒ ⊥
a 6= b,Γ⇒ ∆,⊥
Split⊥
Trace, along either branch, the atom containing c and activated by the
rule in which a 6= c (or b 6= c) is principal. (Observe that if a 6= c or b 6= c
is never principal, the atom can be removed together with the step of
Split⊥ and thus the derivation shortened). If this rule is another instance
of Split⊥, the atom has the form c 6=d, if it is Sn it is of the form a 6= nc.
This latter atom can be principal in Splitn, and we continue by tracing
the active atom of the rule, the one that contains c. Eventually we find
an atom f 6= c in an initial sequent or in Irref . (Observe two things here:
1. By Lemma 11 we need not consider initial sequents for inequality
formulas. 2. If another atom, not containing c, is principal, then also
the conclusion of the rule removing f 6= c is an instance of Irref or of an
initial sequents, so the derivation can be shortened).
If we have the atom f 6= c in an initial sequent, the succedent contains
c, hence also the conclusion does. If f 6= c is principal in Irref , we have
f ≡ c. Consider the step of Split⊥ that removes the atom c 6= c (observe
that this step must be above the instance of Split⊥ from which we started
our analysis, since by hypothesis we were considering the last occurrence
of the term c). Then also the other premiss must contain an atom with
the term c. Trace then along the other branch the atoms containing c
activated in the derivation. Eventually, we find again the term c in an
atom that is principal in an initial sequent or in Irref . In the former
case, we find c in the conclusion of the derivation, in the latter we repeat
the procedure by tracing along the other premiss of the step of Split⊥.
Since the derivation is finite, this cannot go on indefinitely, that is, at
some point we find the term c in an atom that is principal in an initial
sequent.
If a term is removed by Splitn, consider its last occurrence in a step
of the form
a 6= n−1c, a 6= nb,Γ⇒ ∆ b 6= n−1c, a 6= nb,Γ⇒ ∆
a 6= nb,Γ⇒ ∆
Splitn
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Now proceed as for Split⊥, by tracing the activated atoms containing
c. Eventually, an apartness atom containing c is reached and the proof
proceeds as above. ✷
Theorem 30 The sequent ¬ a 6= n+1b ⇒ ¬ a 6= b is not derivable in the
calculus G3EQn.
Proof. We search for a minimal derivation of the sequent. By the in-
vertibility of R ⊃ , the sequent ¬ a 6= n+1b ⇒ ¬ a 6= b is derivable if and
only if ¬ a 6= n+1b, a 6= b⇒ ⊥ is derivable. The last rule in the derivation
of this sequent can be Split⊥, where, by Theorem 29, the middle term
cannot be a new term. If the middle term is b, the derivation is
¬ a 6= n+1b, a 6= b, a 6= b⇒ ⊥ ¬ a 6= n+1b, b 6= b, a 6= b⇒ ⊥
Irref
¬ a 6= n+1b, a 6= b⇒ ⊥
Split⊥
A duplication of the formula a 6= b is found in a premiss and application
of height-preserving contraction gives the conclusion in one step less,
against the hypothesis of minimality; analogously for middle term a.
The last rule can be also Sn
¬ a 6= n+1b, a 6= nb, a 6= b⇒ ⊥
¬ a 6= n+1b, a 6= b⇒ ⊥
Sn
with ¬ a 6= n+1b, a 6= nb, a 6= b⇒ ⊥ conclusion of L ⊃
¬ a 6= n+1b, a 6= nb, a 6= b⇒ a 6= n+1b ⊥, a 6= nb, a 6= b⇒ ⊥
¬ a 6= n+1b, a 6= nb, a 6= b⇒ ⊥
L ⊃
Continuing with L ⊃ would lead to a loop, because it reproduces the
conclusion in its left premiss. Application of rule Defn+1 gives
¬ a 6= n+1b, a 6= nb, a 6= b⇒ a 6= nx, b 6= nx.
By iterating L ⊃ , Splitn, Defn, we obtain sequents where inequality for-
mulas with the same index n appear on the left and right hand-side,
but these are not derivable since their terms do never coincide because
the variable in Defn is fresh.
Finally, if the sequent ¬ a 6= n+1b, a 6= nb, a 6= b ⇒ ⊥ is a conclusion
of Splitn, by Theorem 29 the middle term can be only a or b. If the
middle term is b, the right premiss ¬ a 6= n+1b, b 6=n−1b, a 6= nb, a 6= b ⇒
⊥ is conclusion of Irrefn−1, thus derivable by Corollary 23. The left
78 Bianca Boretti and Sara Negri
premiss is the sequent ¬ a 6= n+1b, a 6= n−1b, a 6= nb, a 6= b⇒ ⊥. By iterating
this process we find the sequent ¬ a 6= n+1b, a 6=0b, . . . , a 6= nb, a 6= b ⇒ ⊥;
analogously if the middle term is a.
If we continue with L ⊃ with left premiss the sequent ¬ a 6= n+1b,
a 6= 0b, . . . , a 6= nb, a 6= b ⇒ a 6= n+1b, proof search fails for the reasons seen
before. By definition of a 6= 0b, the last rule can be also L ⊃ with
¬ a 6= n+1b, a 6=0b, . . . , a 6= nb, a 6= b⇒ ¬ a 6= b
as left premiss, but now proof search continues as from the beginning
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